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Inﬂ  uenza outbreaks during mass gatherings have been 
rarely described, and detailed virologic assessment is lack-
ing. An inﬂ  uenza outbreak occurred during World Youth Day 
in Sydney, Australia, July 2008 (WYD2008). We assessed 
epidemiologic data and respiratory samples collected from 
attendees who sought treatment for inﬂ  uenza-like illness at 
emergency clinics in Sydney during this outbreak. Isolated 
inﬂ  uenza viruses were compared with seasonal inﬂ  uenza 
viruses from the 2008 inﬂ  uenza season. From 100 infected 
attendees, numerous strains were identiﬁ  ed:  oseltamivir-
resistant inﬂ  uenza A (H1N1) viruses, oseltamivir-sensitive 
inﬂ  uenza A (H1N1) viruses, inﬂ  uenza A (H3N2) viruses, and 
strains from both inﬂ  uenza B lineages (B/Florida/4/2006-like 
and B/Malaysia/2506/2004-like). Novel viruses were intro-
duced, and pre-WYD2008 seasonal viruses were ampliﬁ  ed. 
Viruses isolated at mass gatherings can have substantial, 
complex, and unpredictable effects on community inﬂ  uenza 
activity. Greater ﬂ  exibility by public health authorities and 
hospitals is required to appropriately manage and contain 
these outbreaks.
I
nﬂ  uenza is caused by a highly infectious respiratory vi-
rus with the potential to rapidly spread in susceptible 
hosts. Inﬂ  uenza outbreaks have frequently been described 
in populations such as residents of nursing care facilities 
(1,2), residential schools or colleges (3,4), prisons (5), mili-
tary facilities (6), and other enclosed communities (7).
Mass gatherings pose complex and unique challenges 
to public health and medical services. Because popula-
tions are increasingly mobile, and more able to attend 
large gatherings, the risk for outbreaks of inﬂ  uenza and 
other infectious diseases among a susceptible population 
has increased, and a substantial responsibility is placed on 
health services if outbreaks occur. Despite this situation, 
inﬂ   uenza outbreaks during mass gatherings have rarely 
been described (8–10), and reports have not included re-
sults of detailed virologic testing. Furthermore, the effects 
of outbreak strains on local inﬂ  uenza epidemiology have 
not been assessed.
During World Youth Day (WYD2008) celebrations, 
223,000 predominately young pilgrims from 170 countries 
attended a series of mass religious gatherings from July 
15 to July 20, 2008, in Sydney, New South Wales (NSW), 
Australia. At the end of the week, an outdoor evening vigil 
with >200,000 participants preceded the ﬁ  nal mass presid-
ed over by Pope Benedict XVI. This mass was attended by 
an estimated 400,000 persons (11). Approximately 100,000 
pilgrims were given accommodation in sporting facilities, 
schools, and community centers, where temporary ﬂ  oor 
mats and blankets were provided and other facilities were 
shared. The largest site of accommodation, the Sydney 
Olympic Park site, provided lodging for as many as 12,000 
pilgrims each night. Pilgrims remained housed overnight at 
the allocated accommodation sites and attended numerous 
outdoor religious gatherings during the day with other pil-
grims. Many pilgrims traveled in Australia and New Zea-
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land before and after the WYD2008 celebrations, visiting 
major cities and rural areas.
We describe the epidemiologic and virologic features 
of an inﬂ  uenza outbreak predominantly among young adults 
during WYD2008 celebrations. These data provide insight 
into the complexity of inﬂ  uenza outbreaks during mass 
gatherings and their effects on the community at large. The 
insights gained should guide plans for mass events, particu-
larly when held during periods of peak inﬂ  uenza activity.
Methods
Inﬂ  uenza was ﬁ  rst identiﬁ  ed among WYD2008 pil-
grims on July 16, 2008. Emergency clinics were then 
quickly established to identify and isolate infected pil-
grims. Symptomatic pilgrims were encouraged to visit the 
clinics, which were open 24 hours a day.  Epidemiologic 
data were collected prospectively from all pilgrims who 
sought treatment. Respiratory tract samples (paired nose 
and throat swabs specimens) were obtained as previously 
described (12).
Inﬂ  uenza testing included the following: 1) point-of-
care tests (POCTs) performed either on site or in the labo-
ratory (Quickvue A & B; Quidel, San Diego, CA, USA, 
or   BinaxNOW Inﬂ  uenza A & B, Binax, Scarborough, 
ME, USA), 2) antigen detection using type-speciﬁ  c indirect 
ﬂ   uorescent antibodies (IFA) (Chemicon, Millipore, Bil-
lerica, MA, USA, or Bartels, Immunodiagnostic Supplies 
Inc., Bellevue, WA, USA); 3) validated in-house type- and 
subtype-speciﬁ  c nucleic acid testing (NAT) by using PCR 
that targeted the matrix, nonstructural, and hemagglutinin 
region of the inﬂ  uenza virus genome; and 4) virus culture 
using MDCK cells (13). IFA and NAT were the preferred 
diagnostic methods. The decision to perform POCT was 
made on a case-by-case basis by clinicians. Viral culture 
was performed on antigen- (POCT/IFA) or NAT-positive 
specimens. Testing was performed at 2 virology laborato-
ries (Institute of Clinical Pathology and Medical Research, 
Westmead Hospital, Sydney, New South Wales, Australia; 
South Eastern Area Laboratory Service, Prince of Wales 
Hospital, Randwick, New South Wales).
Pilgrims with clinical or laboratory-conﬁ  rmed inﬂ  u-
enza who sought treatment within 48 hours of symptom 
onset were offered oseltamivir (75 mg 2×/d for 5 days). 
Public health authorities recommended that infected pil-
grims remain in isolation for 48 hours or until 5 days after 
symptom onset.
All inﬂ  uenza isolates from WYD2008 were sent to the 
WHO Collaborating Centre for Reference and Research on 
Inﬂ  uenza in Melbourne, Victoria, Australia, where anti-
genic analysis was performed by using a hemagglutination-
inhibition assay (14). Oseltamivir susceptibility was tested 
by using a ﬂ  uorescence-based neuraminidase (NA) inhi-
bition assay (15). When no isolate was available, clinical 
samples were directly tested by rolling circle ampliﬁ  cation 
for the H274Y mutation (the most frequently reported mu-
tation conferring oseltamivir resistance) (16). Hemaggluti-
nin (HA) and NA gene sequencing was performed by using 
standard methods (17). Sequence alignment was performed 
by using ClustalW (www.ebi.ac.uk/Tools/clustalw2/index.
html) in DNAstar Lasergene version 8 (www.dnastar.com), 
and phylogenetic trees were generated by using maximum-
likelihood (DNAML) in PHYLIP (18).
Australia-wide laboratory-conﬁ  rmed  inﬂ  uenza  data 
were obtained from the National Notiﬁ  able Diseases Sur-
veillance System (19). The inﬂ  uenza viruses isolated dur-
ing WYD2008 were compared with viruses submitted to 
the WHO Collaborating Centre from all Australian states 
and territories during the 2008 inﬂ  uenza season. HA and 
NA sequences from WYD2008 viruses were compared 
with a representative sample of seasonal inﬂ  uenza viruses 
from around the world, including Australia, sequenced by 
the WHO Collaborating Centre.
Results
Respiratory tract samples were obtained from 227 
WYD2008 attendees who sought treatment at established 
clinics. The true extent of infection is unknown because 
the pilgrims voluntarily visited the clinics, and respiratory 
tract sampling was limited at several accommodation sites 
after the outbreak was identiﬁ  ed. The median age of the pil-
grims tested was 21 years (range 12–72 years, interquartile 
range 18–28 years); 62.8% were female. Twenty-nine per-
cent of pilgrims tested lived in Australia, and the remain-
der were from overseas (Europe, 28.0%; Oceania, 20.2%; 
North America, 17.1%; South or Central America, 2.6%; 
Asia, 2.6%; Africa, 0.5%). Recent inﬂ  uenza vaccination 
was infrequent; 25 (21.6%) of 116 reported recent vaccina-
tion (Southern Hemisphere, 12.0%; Northern Hemisphere, 
27.9%; p = 0.021). Demographic characteristics of pilgrims 
who visited established clinics were not signiﬁ  cantly dif-
ferent from those of the total pilgrim population (11).
Two or more inﬂ   uenza diagnostic tests were per-
formed on all specimens (POCT, 80%; IFA, 100%; NAT, 
97%; and virus culture, 43%). Laboratory conﬁ  rmation of 
inﬂ  uenza virus infection was obtained for 100 (44.1%) pil-
grims. This included 69 patients whose test results were 
positive by both antigen detection (POCT or IFA) and 
NAT, 21 patients with positive results by NAT yet nega-
tive by antigen detection, 5 patients with positive results 
by both antigen detection and viral culture, and 5 patients 
with positive results by 2 antigen detection methods (when 
clinical material was not sufﬁ  cient for NAT or culture). Pil-
grims had symptoms for a median of 2 days before they 
visited a clinic (95% conﬁ  dence interval 1.7–2.7 days). No 
signiﬁ  cant differences in age, sex, or country of origin were 
noted between the pilgrims with laboratory-conﬁ  rmed cas-
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es, pilgrims whose test results were negative, and pilgrims 
who were not tested (data not shown).
Inﬂ   uenza types A and B were identiﬁ  ed  during 
WYD2008 (Table). Inﬂ  uenza A was most frequently iso-
lated from patients from Australia and Germany, whereas 
inﬂ   uenza B was most frequently isolated from patients 
from the Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea, Austra-
lia, and North America. Numerous distinct circulating 
inﬂ   uenza viruses were identiﬁ  ed:  oseltamivir-resistant 
inﬂ   uenza A (H1N1) A/Brisbane/59/2007-like viruses, 
oseltamivir-sensitive inﬂ  uenza A (H1N1) viruses (no iso-
late was recovered for serotyping), inﬂ  uenza A (H3N2) A/
Brisbane/10/2007-like viruses, and both inﬂ  uenza B viral 
lineages (B/Florida/4/2006-like [B/Yamagata-lineage] and 
B/Malaysia/2506/2004-like [B/Victoria-lineage] viruses).
This outbreak occurred in the context of low seasonal 
inﬂ  uenza activity in Australia (Figure 1). An increase in 
inﬂ  uenza A and B activity was identiﬁ  ed in all Austra-
lian states and territories in the weeks after WYD2008. 
Inﬂ  uenza isolates from WYD2008 were compared with 
a representative sample of national seasonal inﬂ  uenza 
isolates (12.7% of the total Australian 2008 laboratory-
conﬁ  rmed inﬂ  uenza cases). Before WYD2008, inﬂ  uenza 
(H3N2) A/Brisbane/10/2007-like and B/Florida/4/2006-
like viruses were the predominant early season viral sub-
types/strains observed Australia-wide (33.3% and 58.8%, 
respectively; Figure 2). Subsequent to WYD2008, B/
Malaysia/2506/2004-like and B/Florida/4/2006-like vi-
ruses were the most frequently identiﬁ  ed inﬂ  uenza strains 
(41.0% and 35.7%, respectively).
The genetic relatedness of WYD2008 viruses to pre- 
and post-WYD2008 viruses was examined by sequence 
alignment of the HA gene (Figure 3) and NA gene (data 
not shown).
Before WYD2008, oseltamivir-resistant inﬂ  uenza A 
(H1N1) Brisbane/59/2007-like viruses were uncommon 
in Australia, and only 3 cases had been identiﬁ  ed (Figure 
2). Two cases were observed in South Australia 5 weeks 
and 3 days before WYD2008 (Figure 3, panel A, isolates 
1–2). The remaining case was identiﬁ  ed in Victoria in a 
returned traveler 5 days before WYD2008 (Figure 3, panel 
A, isolate 3). No obvious epidemiologic links were identi-
ﬁ  ed between pre-WYD2008 and WYD2008 oseltamivir-
resistant inﬂ  uenza A (H1N1) viruses. Furthermore, iso-
lates 1–3 appeared distinct from WYD2008 isolates. All 
WYD2008 inﬂ  uenza A (H1N1) isolates clustered relatively 
closely (Figure 3, panel A, isolates 4–16) and shared se-
quence homology with other 2008 Southern Hemisphere 
oseltamivir-resistant isolates. Epidemiologic data showed 
that most Australian and European pilgrims infected with 
oseltamivir-resistant A (H1N1) had traveled from Victoria 
to Sydney in the week before WYD2008. Despite this, os-
eltamivir-resistant A (H1N1) viruses were responsible for 
<10% of typed inﬂ  uenza virus infections. (Figure 2; Figure 
3, panel A, isolates 17–19).
Genetic analysis of WYD2008 inﬂ  uenza A (H3N2) 
A/Brisbane/10/2007–like viruses demonstrated 2 distinct 
phylogenetic groups. The ﬁ  rst inﬂ  uenza A (H3N2) cluster 
was obtained from Australian and New Zealand pilgrims 
only and was genetically related to sporadic Australian 
pre- and post-WYD2008 inﬂ   uenza isolates (Figure 3, 
panel B: pre-WYD2008, isolates 1–6; WYD2008 Aus-
tralian/NZ cluster, isolates 7–8; post-WYD2008, isolates 
9–13). The second phylogenetic group included inﬂ  uenza 
A (H3N2) viruses isolated from pilgrims from Germany 
and Italy (Figure 3, panel B: isolates 14–17; WYD2008 
European cluster) and appeared to be closely related to 
inﬂ  uenza strains found in Southeast Asia in 2008. No evi-
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Table. Virologic data from laboratory-confirmed World Youth Day 2008 influenza cases* 
Virus type/subtype 
Pilgrim country of origin, no. infections 
Total no. 
infections  Australia Europe Oceania 
North
America
Other region 
or unknown 
Influenza A (H1N1) (A/Brisbane/59/2007–
like) oseltamivir resistant 
14 6 (Germany, Czech 
Republic, France, 
Italy, Poland) 
00 4 2 4
Influenza A (H1N1) (serotype unknown) 
oseltamivir sensitive 
1 9 (Germany, Italy)  0 0 3 13
Influenza A (H3N2) (A/Brisbane/10/2007–
like) 
2 9 (Germany, Italy, 
Slovakia, Spain) 
0 2 (USA)  1 14
Influenza A (subtype/serotype not 
available)
2 4 (Germany, 
France) 
0 2 (USA)  2 10
Influenza B (B/Malaysia/2506/2004–like)  2 0 7 (Solomon 
Islands, New 
Zealand,
Tonga, PNG) 
3 (USA, 
Canada) 
11 3
Influenza B (B/Florida/4/2006–like)  2 0 0 1 (USA)  1 4
Influenza B (serotype not available)  6 0 7 (Solomon
Islands, PNG)
3 (USA, 
Canada) 
62 2
Total 29 28 14 11 18 100
*PNG, Papua New Guinea. RESEARCH
dence of similar strains was found in Australia before or 
after WYD2008. 
Before WYD2008, only 4 cases of inﬂ  uenza B/Ma-
laysia–like virus infection were identiﬁ  ed Australia-wide 
(Figure 2). Two isolates from NSW were found to be dis-
tinct from WYD2008 isolates by sequence analysis (Figure 
3, panel C, isolates 1–2). The remaining viruses (Figure 3, 
panel C, isolates 3–4) were identiﬁ  ed in Queensland 2 and 
5 days before WYD2008 and appeared to be closely related 
to WYD2008 isolates (Figure 3, panel C, isolates 5–10). 
No epidemiologic links to WYD2008 cases were identi-
ﬁ  ed. Pilgrims from the Solomon Islands sought treatment 
for a febrile illness at rural medical facilities 5 days be-
fore WYD2008, while they were staying close to the NSW/
Queensland border. Subsequent review suggests that these 
illnesses were most likely inﬂ  uenza. WYD2008 pilgrims 
with conﬁ  rmed inﬂ  uenza B/Malaysia–like virus infection 
were identiﬁ  ed among contacts of these original clinical 
case-patients. Sequence analysis of WYD2008 isolates 
(Figure 3, panel C, isolates 5–10) clustered closely with 
isolates obtained throughout Australia post-WYD2008 
(Figure 3, panel C: isolates 11–17). Because several pil-
grims infected with inﬂ   uenza B/Malaysia-like viruses 
either lived or traveled through New Zealand en route to 
Sydney, we explored the idea that the inﬂ  uenza B/Malay-
sia from New Zealand was introduced. Peak inﬂ  uenza B/
Malaysia activity in New Zealand occurred 4 weeks be-
fore peak activity was detected in Australia (20). Further-
more, WYD2008 isolates clustered closely with pre- and 
post-WYD2008 New Zealand isolates (Figure 3, panel C). 
Inﬂ  uenza B/Malaysia-like viruses also could have been in-
troduced into both New Zealand and Australia from Pa-
ciﬁ  c Island countries.No clear trends were identiﬁ  ed with 
oseltamivir-sensitive inﬂ  uenza A (H1N1) and inﬂ  uenza B/
Florida/4/2006-like viruses when WYD2008 and commu-
nity isolates were compared (data not shown). 
Discussion
Thousands of mass gathering events are held each 
year, including major sporting events, festivals, demon-
strations, and pilgrimages. Mass gatherings of a scale seen 
with WYD2008 have the potential to create health risks 
for those attending and the community at large. Although 
outbreaks of communicable diseases during mass gather-
ings have been described, insufﬁ  cient epidemiologic and 
pathogen-related data have been described to characterize 
the outbreak, measure the impact on the wider community, 
or guide management of future mass gatherings (8–10).
WYD2008 presented a unique opportunity to study the ef-
fects of inﬂ  uenza on mass gatherings by combining epide-
miologic data acquired through prospective data collection, 
laboratory data obtained after respiratory tract sampling, 
and surveillance data obtained through established Austra-
lia-wide inﬂ  uenza laboratory networks.
A notable inﬂ  uenza outbreak occurred during WYD2008, 
likely exacerbated by crowded living conditions, the pres-
ence of multiple circulating inﬂ  uenza viruses, and low im-
munization rates. The true effects of inﬂ  uenza infection are 
unknown because not all infected pilgrims visited clinics and 
respiratory tract sampling was not performed on all clinic pa-
tients. The epidemiologic and virologic data gathered during 
WYD2008 highlight the complexity of an inﬂ  uenza outbreak 
within a large mass gathering. At least 6 distinct viruses 
circulated among pilgrims during WYD2008; 2 distinct in-
ﬂ  uenza A (H1N1) viruses (oseltamivir-resistant and -sensi-
tive), 2 distinct inﬂ  uenza A (H3N2) viruses (Australian/New 
Zealand and European clusters), and 2 distinct inﬂ  uenza B 
viruses (B/Malaysia–like and B/Florida–like). Different vi-
ruses were more likely to circulate in different groups within 
the pilgrim population, which suggests that exposure was not 
random but inﬂ  uenced by country of origin and travel before 
WYD2008.
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Figure 1. Laboratory-conﬁ  rmed  inﬂ   uenza A (A) and B (B) cases 
during World Youth Day 2008 (WYD2008; insets) compared with 
national seasonal inﬂ  uenza data (main graphs). Data are presented 
as the number of laboratory-conﬁ  rmed cases per day for WYD2008 
and per week for national inﬂ  uenza surveillance. Because laboratory 
methods to detect community inﬂ   uenza activity vary between 
different states, the relative effects of inﬂ  uenza in each state are 
not comparable. NSW, New South Wales; ACT, Australian Capital 
Territory; WA, Western Australia; SA, South Australia; NT, Northern 
Territory. *Background rate of laboratory-conﬁ  rmed  inﬂ  uenza  for 
NSW/ACT included for comparison. †National data are inclusive 
of inﬂ   uenza cases diagnosed by antigen detection, nucleic acid 
testing, and viral isolation.  Inﬂ  uenza and Mass Gathering
Mass gatherings with attendees traveling from over-
seas allow for the introduction of novel inﬂ  uenza viruses as 
well as the ampliﬁ  cation of preexisting community strains. 
Among the strains identiﬁ  ed during WYD2008, inﬂ  uenza 
A (H3N2) viruses (Australian/New Zealand cluster) and 
B/Florida-like viruses appear closely related to viruses 
that were circulating in the community before WYD2008. 
Although rarely isolated before WYD2008, oseltamivir-
resistant inﬂ  uenza A/H1N1 and B/Malaysia–like viruses 
isolated from pilgrims are potentially related to viruses 
cultured from nonpilgrims in South Australia, Victoria, 
and Queensland, raising the possibility of local acquisition 
rather than introduction from overseas. Other viruses, such 
as inﬂ  uenza A (H3N2) (European cluster), were not detect-
ed in Australia before WYD2008 and thus appear to have 
been introduced with the pilgrims.
Exploring the inﬂ  uence of a mass gathering on com-
munity inﬂ  uenza activity is complex, especially when nu-
merous viruses circulate during such an event. In 2008, the 
total number of laboratory-conﬁ  rmed inﬂ  uenza cases in 
Australia was 1.9× the 5-year average yet not signiﬁ  cantly 
different from the number of cases diagnosed in 2007 (19). 
WYD2008 coincided with the start of the normal inﬂ  uenza 
season in Australia, which is usually greatest between July 
and September (21,22). Thus, the rapid rise in inﬂ  uenza A 
and B activity in all states after WYD2008 may have oc-
curred despite WYD2008. To add to the complexity are 
the differing and unpredictable consequences of each in-
dividual viral subtype/strain. This complexity is illustrated 
by oseltamivir-resistant A (H1N1) and the B/Malaysia-
like inﬂ  uenza viruses, which were rarely detected before 
WYD2008 but responsible for 24%–34% and 13%–35% of 
infections in pilgrims tested. Pilgrim groups had substantial 
contact with nonpilgrims through travel in Australia before 
and after WYD2008. Despite this contact, post-WYD2008 
dissemination of inﬂ  uenza A (H1N1) was modest compared 
with dissemination of inﬂ  uenza B/Malaysia-like viruses (A 
[H1N1], 8.1% of all post-WYD2008 isolates; B/Malaysia, 
41.0% of all post-WYD2008 isolates).
A potential explanation for the substantial effect of in-
ﬂ  uenza B/Malaysia-like viruses observed post-WYD2008 
is reduced community immunity to inﬂ  uenza B. In 2007, 
inﬂ  uenza B was an infrequent pathogen (6.9% of total iso-
lates typed); inﬂ  uenza A (H3N2) and A (H1N1) viruses 
were most frequently detected (58.7% and 34.4% of total 
isolates typed or subtyped) (21). In the 2003–2006 inﬂ  uenza 
seasons, inﬂ  uenza B was responsible for a low prevalence 
of disease compared with inﬂ  uenza A (6%–35% of total in-
ﬂ  uenza isolates typed) (22–25). Inﬂ  uenza A (H1N1) A/Sol-
omon Island/3/2006–like, A (H3N2) A/Brisbane/10/2007–
like, and B/Florida/4/2006–like viruses were chosen to be 
included in the Southern Hemisphere winter 2008 inﬂ  uenza 
vaccine. Both the low rate of inﬂ  uenza B activity in preced-
ing seasons and mismatch of B/Malaysia–like viruses with 
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Figure 2. Relative effects of different inﬂ  uenza viruses before (pre) and after (post) World Youth Day 2008 for A) Australia; B) Western 
Australia; C) South Australia and Northern Territory; D) Queensland; E) New South Wales and Australian Capital Territory; and F) Victoria 
and Tasmania. The size of each pie chart is approximately proportional to the number of virus isolates analyzed from each region. RESEARCH
the vaccine strain may have contributed to the greater B/
Malaysia–like virus activity seen in community inﬂ  uenza 
in 2008.
Those who plan future mass gatherings need to consider 
the potential for inﬂ  uenza outbreaks. As observed, multiple 
viruses may circulate among those attending, thus increas-
ing the opportunity for the emergence of novel reassort-
ment viruses. Public health services need to be prepared to 
establish clinics rapidly and likely at many locations. Rapid 
diagnostic testing needs to be available, and laboratories 
need to be prepared for a rapid inﬂ  ux of specimens. Be-
cause viruses may be introduced, reliance on local rates of 
antiviral resistance may be misleading and resistance data 
from other countries may not be available. The circulation 
of oseltamivir-resistant seasonal inﬂ  uenza A (H1N1) and 
emergence of oseltamivir-sensitive inﬂ  uenza A pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 virus (26) highlight the need for rapid typing 
of inﬂ  uenza viruses during outbreaks to guide the public 
health response. In inﬂ  uenza outbreaks in which circulat-
ing viruses include resistant seasonal inﬂ  uenza A (H1N1) 
virus, reliance on oseltamivir alone is likely to be insuf-
ﬁ  cient. Inﬂ  uenza vaccination of all those attending should 
be recommended before mass gatherings, especially when 
held during the host countries’ inﬂ  uenza season and given 
the likely emergence of antiviral resistance. Although pil-
grims were encouraged to be vaccinated before attending 
WYD2008, the rate of recent vaccination was low. Because 
numerous viruses may circulate, vaccination may be insuf-
ﬁ  cient to protect against all inﬂ  uenza strains.
This study has several limitations. First, clinics were 
established rapidly and involved numerous clinicians; thus, 
the prospectively collected data were not standardized. Sec-
ond, only pilgrims who visited clinics with symptoms were 
assessed, and the proportion of the pilgrim population that 
had an inﬂ  uenza-like illness or asymptomatic infection is 
unknown. Third, the actual proportions of viruses detected 
and the pilgrim populations infected may differ from those 
described because respiratory tract sampling was restricted 
at several clinics after the identiﬁ  cation of an outbreak. 
Fourth, Australian inﬂ   uenza type/subtype data used for 
comparison may be inﬂ  uenced by a referral bias from state-
based reference laboratories. Finally, only representative 
isolates sent to the WHO Collaborating Centre underwent 
sequence analysis, so further related or unrelated isolates 
may not have been analyzed.
After epidemiologic and virologic assessment of the 
WYD2008 outbreak, we highlight the complexity of inﬂ  u-
enza outbreaks that occur during mass gatherings with nu-
merous viruses co-circulating among attendees. Mass gath-
erings enable introduction of novel inﬂ  uenza strains into 
the local population and the ampliﬁ  cation of circulating 
local seasonal inﬂ  uenza strains, or both, thereby increasing 
the opportunity for novel reassortment inﬂ  uenza viruses 
to emerge. This introduction or ampliﬁ  cation of viruses 
in contained outbreaks may alter seasonal inﬂ  uenza activ-
ity subsequent to a mass gathering. The resultant effect on 
seasonal inﬂ  uenza activity is inﬂ  uenced by many compet-
ing forces, including population movement and preexisting 
immunity, and thus remains unpredictable. The potential 
for a substantial inﬂ  uenza outbreak needs to be considered 
before all mass gathering events, particularly when hosted 
during the months of peak inﬂ  uenza activity (27,28). Great-
er ﬂ  exibility by public health and hospitals is required to 
appropriately manage and contain these outbreaks.
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Figure 3. Phylogenetic trees illustrating relatedness of hemagglutinin sequences from inﬂ  uenza A (H1N1) (A), A (H3N2) (B), and B/
Malaysia-like viruses (C) from pre–World Youth Day 2008 (WYD2008) Australian isolates (z), WYD2008 isolates (†), post-WYD2008 
Australian isolates (S), and related international isolates. Trees were constructed by using maximum-likelihood (DNAml) in PHYLIP.  Only 
bootstrap values >60 are included. Inﬂ  uenza and Mass Gathering
Other members of the World Youth Day Study Group: V. 
Sintchenko, G.L. Gilbert (Westmead Hospital); N. Komadina, R. 
Shaw (WHO Collaborating Centre for Inﬂ  uenza):S. Adamson, 
J. Fizzell (New South Wales Health–Biopreparedness Centre); 
P.M. Fennell, F. Ba Alawi (Prince of Wales Hospital); S. Cor-
bett, K. Weston, G. Truman, O. Nguyen, J. Paterson, S. Gabriel, 
C. Moreira, B. Forssman (Sydney West Public Health Unit); M. 
Cretikos, P. Maywood, V. Bowden, C. Lowbridge (Sydney South 
West Public Health Unit); and S. Williams, M. Torres, L. Heron 
(North Sydney Central Coast Public Health Unit).
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